








Legal and Extra-legal Elements of Motivation 
in Legislation and Interpretation of Law  
– a Judge’s Thoughts 
 
 
1. General introduction 
 
The law is a large complex system of abstract rules. Finding law is a complicated intellectual 
hermeneutical activity
1
. Without going into a detailed discussion about the definition, I 
understand law as the set of rules that effectively make society work. Legal interpretation 
therefore encompasses not only the legislative texts and prior judgments but also law in 
general, its factual context, the notion itself of a social reality in which rules must be 
applied. In the context of the creation of legal rules, every member of the legislative body 
also needs to understand and, thus, to interpret the bill that is proposed for adoption.  
The law lives and is a vibrant part of human society. For example, the form of 
contracts as they are actually entered into offers interesting insights into the manner in 
which ordinary people understand rules and act upon them. Very often, contracts are 
concluded on the basis of outdated or simply incorrect templates, which are contrary to the 
Civil Code. Nevertheless, nobody protests the situation and the contract is executed. In 
such a case, where is the law?  
To analyse the interpretation and application of a law, a pluridisciplinary approach is 
necessary. Seen from a wider context, a sociological phenomenon undeniably leads to 
consequences that are normative while every legal decision is sociologically and 
psychologically motivated and influenced. Consequently, human behaviour becomes 
law, for example in the form of a judgement, the judicial interpretation being a part of 
creation and application of law. Even the political science elements are very important.
2
  
As a result, the interpretation and application of law has many components. In every 
juridical activity, individual intellectual activity of cognition and analysis is joined by an 
interaction between many individuals. The competence, honesty, attention, emotions, 
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partiality, individual and collective interests of every participant play a role. In every 
social environment implicated in the creation and application of law, legal concepts are 
mixed with extra-legal elements.  
Obviously, one can try to differentiate the normative elements from the extra-
normative ones. Thus, normative elements can be defined as those related strictly to a 
legal process, separated from any kind of exterior influence. Such a limitation is closely 
related to the notion of legitimacy, which refers to the direct function of a formally 
recognized legal rule, thereby excluding every extra-normative element, such as more or 
less hidden interests or motivations behind the creation or application of a legal rule. At 
the same time, not every extra-normative element is necessarily illegal, and some 
influence from exterior is inevitable in practice. In consequence, the notion of legitimacy 
in itself cannot fully describe the entire process of the creation of a legal rule. 
In my reasoning, I try to take a wide view of the context, given that restricting one’s 
thinking only to one narrow question leads to an incomplete and often even distorted picture. 
Therefore, I endeavour to take into account the maximum number of elements possible. At 
the same time, while choosing this approach, I’m aware that the potentially infinite and 
inexhaustible set of relevant elements has to be reduced in the frame of this short 
contribution.
3
 Also, I generally do not distinguish between international or national 
jurisdictions because in my opinion, they share a lot of common features which I try to identify.  
The subject of extra-normative elements gaining normative status goes beyond the 
problem that has been defined by K. Lenaerts as the “borderline between law and 
politics”.
4
 After all, the law had already been defined by classical jurisprudence
5
 as a 
system of enforcement of human interests, and the scale of human interests is wider than 
politics. We usually understand the politics as a mechanism designed to express group 
interests, while opportunism and similar motivations also take into consideration very 
individual interests. My subject concerns, generally, the penetration of legal rules by 
motives or elements which aren’t justified legally. Politics, on the other hand, can and often 
do penetrate legal rules in a completely legal manner, forming even their explicit content. 
It is nonetheless interesting to mention the apparent contradiction in K Lenaerts’ 
argument on the relation between law and politics, highlighted by JHH Weiler.
6
 On the 
one hand, K. Lenaerts restricts the legitimacy of the Court to looking only for law, whilst 




Politics clearly constitute elements of reasoning existing outside the law. Yet, when 
the legal rule is not clear or where a lacuna exists, the interpretation necessarily has to 
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rely on extra-legal factual context, which may mean taking into account the political 
aspects that form the basis of the rule. For the most part, a judge taking into account a 
political element is aware of this circumstance and is convinced that his choice is 
justified by the fact that it helps to attain a desirable goal. While this is not necessarily 
true, it does legitimize the judge’s choice and tends to strengthen his integrity. 
In practice, for example, the goal of competition law is the protection of competition. 
This goal is, nevertheless, also a policy of the European Union. If the interpretation follows 
this goal, it is completely legitimate. 
In this case, therefore, the extra-normative element is embraced by the law, and 
normative and extra-normative elements become inseparable. Thus, K. Lenaerts’ 
analysis is less contradictory than one might imagine.  
The situation is more problematic where the creation or interpretation of a legal rule is 
motivated by opportunism, i.e. where some political or personal interest is put before the 
very sense of the law, with the latter including a legitimate political aspect which cannot 
be avoided in interpretation, as mentioned above. The relevant personal interest is not 
necessarily only individual; it can also be an interest of a group, of some institution etc. 
Opportunism is a more frequent motivation of the legislation and of the interpretation of 
law than we often care to admit. This is due to the fact that the evolution of law very clearly 
reflects human psychology. For every human being it is natural to pursue one’s goals. In 
legal matters, every participant endeavours to achieve his goals through his legal activity. 
The dominance of economic considerations over legal ones can be analysed as a 
specific case of opportunism. In this respect, I cannot but agree with F. Teffo, according 
to which “as to the upheavals witnessed in the legal sphere, the explanation offered has 
very soon been that of the considerable increase of the influence, in developed 
contemporary societies, of economic facts, which ruthlessly exercise their tyranny over 
law”.
8
 F. Teffo goes on to quote the important words of Josserand, according to whom 
“earlier, where an institution or scheme conflicted with morals, its fate was sealed, 
regardless of the fact that it would present otherwise, and when regarded on the 
economic level, obvious advantages”.
9
 
Still, opportunism is not necessarily completely bad. It tends, in fact, to go in the same 
direction as “effet utile”, even though it is more extensive. Therefore, I will distinguish between 
“bad opportunism”, where some action is motivated by egoistical and, at times, illegal 
elements, and “good opportunism”, where the motivation is generally in line with the public 
interest, even though the dividing line between the two is not always clear or easy to discern.  
The importance of extra-legal elements, such as political aspects or opportunism, is 
not uniform in all branches of law. Hence, we have a scale with, at one end, a strictly 
normative view clearly separated from every extra-legal element except for a legally 
justified content of the rule or of the context, and, at the other end, pure personal or 
collective opportunism. The strictly normative view is more frequent in relationships 
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falling exclusively under private law, such as contract law, and in national law rather 
than European Union law. For example, the adoption of restrictive measures such as the 
freezing of assets is a juridical solution to a purely political question. At the same time, 
consumer litigation based on private law could cover an important political aspect, i.e. 
the aspect of the consumer protection policy. 
When considering the ultimate impact of the extra-legal elements, we shall keep in mind 
that the law, as it really exists, is the end result of many influences, the only important issue 
being whether or not the bad ones prevail over the good ones. The criterion permitting to 
distinguish the good from the bad can hopefully be found in the extensive ethics literature on 
the subject, as well as in the human law instinct such as that described by von Jhering.
10
 
In this context, the importance of the personal qualities of individuals should be 
stressed. True altruists are a very rare breed. If such an individual can drive the evolution 
of law, he can leave behind him a very good long-term legacy. The opposite is also true, 
the negative effects of bad solutions potentially being just as long-lasting and onerous. At 
times, it can be observed that choosing one particular person rather than another has 
substantial effect on the evolution of society in general; a person can be very competent 
but, if he or she is unable to put public interest, the function and context of law above 
personal or group interests, it can hardly be expected that he or she will adopt the right 
solutions. The ability to suppress particular interests in favour of the idea of law requires a 
certain kind of enthusiasm, and supposes that finding the law is not only considered a job, 
but, in some ways, a mission. However, modern society has not been able to resolve the 
problem of education and selection of persons satisfactorily. It needs many lawyers, but 
there are only a few passionate “legal missionaries”. As a result, many of those creating 
and interpreting law are shaped by political, economic and even opportunistic interests, 
the aspect of justice becoming secondary, rather than primordial. The situation is further 
aggravated by the spread of new technologies and the ensuing explosion of the quantity of 
information, which can be used to manipulate the public, including the lawyers. 
As a result of all the foregoing, it would be difficult to deny the existence, to some 
degree, of extra-legal elements in all kinds of legal activities. Therefore, in the next part, I 
will examine (1) the legislative procedure, (2) the case-law of the courts, (3) the pleadings 
of attorneys and also (4) the academia. 
 
 
2. Legal and extra-legal elements in different branches of legal activity 
 
2. 1. Legislative procedure 
 
In the legislative sphere, law is a part of politics and politics embodies law. This means, 
obviously, that political motivation – arguments of policy – prevails absolutely, as described 
by R. Dworkin.
11
 If we take the example of a legally complex proposal, the individual 
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legislators will trust, to a large extent, the professional lawyers drafting the bill. There is a 
correlation between, on the one side, the length and the nature of a bill and, on the other side, 
the number of political (or other) external interventions. The longer and more complicated a 
proposal is, the less external interventions there will be normally in Parliament. For instance, 
the new Czech Civil Code,
12
 with more than 3000 articles, was adopted without substantial 
modifications, even though it brought in many very important changes of a political nature. 
Although the general context of a bill is motivated politically, the detailed solutions 
are drafted by legal professionals. Other political elements, however, influence the bill 
more markedly by way of lobbyism, or even corruption or opportunism during the 
legislative procedure. Legislators with limited knowledge of a topic can easily be 
manipulated and their vote will say nothing about the real legitimacy or propriety of a 
rule. From the point of view of opportunism, we can observe that, globally, political 
motivation presented to the public appears more or less correct, but when it comes to the 
details, the real motivation often can be traced to “bad” opportunism or a lack of 
knowledge or comprehension. The extent of this penetration is inversely proportionate 
to the level of both political and legal culture, with the main factor being Dworkin’s 
“political morality”.
13
 Any minor point in a voluminous proposal can be used as a tool 
of manipulation, in order to approve or dismiss the bill. No rational argument can be 
presented to those legislators who do not have considerable knowledge of the matter 
and who, sometimes, do not want to understand. Even a false statement can be decisive 
for the adoption or refusal of the bill. Communication between law professionals and 
legislators very frequently fails, leaving the door open for manipulators. As a 
consequence, many bad rules, with sometimes catastrophic consequences, are adopted, 
become formally part of the law and are applied in social relations, whilst it is very 
difficult to allege any illegality. If the level of a political culture is low, the 
opportunistic motivation of some legislators is not even hidden, such as may be the case 
with the rejection of a ban on smoking, where any honest justification is hard to find. 
Similarly, while the precise wording of an adopted law may be, to a large extent, 
haphazard, the same can be hardly said, for instance, about the omission of the 
provision granting the right to compensation for antitrust infringements in the Czech 




2. 2. Judiciary 
 
A judge is a professional lawyer, which should mean fewer problems with understanding, 
manipulation and communication than can be found in a Parliament. Nevertheless, the judge 
obviously has to communicate with parties and he must understand their pleas and the facts. 
He has to identify the relevant rules, interpret them and apply them correctly.  
                                                 
12  Act No. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code. 
13  DWORKIN, R., Justice for Hedgehogs, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 406. The author treats „law as a 
part of political morality“, adding that „personal morality may be thought to flow from ethics“ and that 
„political morality might be seen to flow from personal morality“. In Dworkin’s view, „we can easily place 
the doctrinal concept of law in that tree structure: law is a branch, a subdivision, of political morality“. The 
notion of morality is explained by the the author on pp.255-270. 
14  Act No. 143/2001 Coll., on the Protection of Competition. 
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In this respect, it is relevant whether or not the procedure includes an oral hearing. It is 
true that new technologies bring closer oral and written procedures, with the recordings of 
oral pleadings becoming standard practice. Still, it is not always evident to understand an 
attorney’s oral pleading, let alone that of the party itself, in cases where representation is not 
mandatory, especially since parties can lie or distort reality, intentionally or not. 
Other important elements are whether the case is decided by a chamber or by a 
single judge, how many judges are in the composition of the chamber, whether the 
judge cooperates with assistants, whether the court sends written questions to the parties 
prior to the hearing etc. Judges working under time constraints may misunderstand and 
incorrectly appreciate facts or pleas. Also, the professional level of attorneys plays a 
very important role. Usually, attorneys do not have a thorough knowledge of the file 
and written questions provide better results.  
Apart from these internal factors, the problem of extra-legal elements, be they politics 
or opportunism, emerges here too. 
One frequent example is the case where a judge reviews an administrative decision 
and concludes that, while it is perfectly correct as to the substance, it is vitiated by some 
formal mistake, such as an absence of reasons, contradictory reasoning or a contradiction 
between the reasons given and the operative part of the decision. The judge might be 
tempted not to annul the decision, knowing that an annulment will only lengthen the 
procedure, prolonging the parties’ uncertainty about the outcome and increasing their 
costs, while in the end, the administrative authority will have to adopt a new decision with 
a similar content. Obviously, in this situation we are confronted with “good” opportunism 
and there is no political aspect. The judge’s thinking tends to emphasize the practical 
consequences of his decision, going in the direction of “effet utile” but beyond the limit of 
this principle, while the law stipulates formal requirements for the sake of the principle of 
the rights of defence. We might ask which approach is better in a situation where different 
legal principles – the certainty of law, the rights of defence and the principle of good 
administration – come into conflict. Nevertheless, any decision other than annulment goes 
against the law. Therefore, the judge should comply with the prevailing legal principle, 
even though the outcome may not satisfy the parties. 
Let us imagine another example where two institutions, acting each within its own 
competencies, adopt two contradictory decisions concerning the legality of a certain 
practice, based partly on the same facts and legal criteria. The situation is complicated by 
the fact that the first institution adopted its decision on the basis of a formal proposal by 
the second, which, at that time, chose not to exercise its power to object to the practice in 
question by presenting a different proposal. A first-instance judge tasked with assessing 
the legality of the second decision may annul it, preferring the principle of coherency of 
law. However, he may be overturned by the appellate judge, who may give more weight 
to the independence of the respective competences of the two institutions. While both 
judges take into consideration the context, they each stress a different element of that 
context. Which of the two judicial decisions is objectively legal?  
Another current example from Czech practice raises the question of whether a judicial 
decision can directly contradict a legislative text. Article 441 of the new Czech Civil Code 
provides that a formal condition applicable to the signing of an act – such as the requirement 
of a notarial record – must also be respected where a power of attorney is granted with 
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respect to the same act. The granting of powers of attorney being common, such an 
obligation leads to enormous problems in practice, generating significant costs and 
administrative burdens. In reaction, the Czech Supreme Court has ruled that the formal 
condition does not have to be respected where the identity of the person granting the power 
of attorney is undisputable.
15
 This interpretation is, of course, simply contra legem; however, 
given that it is reasonable, such a characterisation is not sufficient per se. On the other hand, 
the intention of the legislator was clearly opposite. Does a clear expression of the legislator’s 
will constitute the limit which the judiciary can never overstep? When the Supreme Court 
crosses that limit, what does that mean for the legislative rule in question and its legitimacy? 
Was the relevant article of the Civil Code abrogated in this manner? Here, the motivation of 
the decision is neither political nor moral, but simply practical with regard to the comfort of 
the users of law, thus being similar to the first example above. At the same time, by enacting 
the rule in question, the legislator explicitly intended to strengthen the protection of the party 
represented, unfortunately ignoring or underestimating the practical consequences. If the 
case-law is maintained by the Supreme Court, it will prevail over the legislative text and 
become part of the effective law. 
Similar examples can of course be found in the case-law of the European Court of 
Justice. As demonstrated by JHH Weiler, in the Sturgeon
16
 judgment the Court went 
farther than the legislator, who provided for compensation only in case of the cancellation 
of a flight, by deciding the same right could be claimed in case of delay. Here also, the 
judge intentionally creates a new and different rule in the law.  
Therefore, even in European continental law, case-law can become stronger than 
statutory law.  
My final, and rather complicated, example pertains to competition law, and 
specifically to a case where a competition authority decides that several companies that 
formerly belonged to the same undertaking shall be held jointly and severally liable for 
the payment of the amount of the fine, without determining the proportion according to 
which they shall ultimately share the amount of the fine among themselves. In this 
situation, the first judge might consider that such an omission is inappropriate and 
decide, within its full jurisdiction to review fines, to apply a rule inspired by private law 
according to which, unless specified otherwise, the shares of the different companies 
shall be equal. On appeal, the second judge might disagree, considering that the 
question of the settlement among the companies is of no interest to the competition 
authority, the joint and several liability having for sole objective to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the recovery of fines imposed for the infringement and, therefore, the 
deterrent effect of those fines, by stemming the risk of insolvency of one of the co-
debtors. From this point of view, the settlement to be arranged among the companies 
once the fine has been paid to the authority is simply their own problem. 
In this case, the judicial interpretation could be analysed as having several levels of 
abstract reasoning. The first judge stressed the function of competition law and the 
administrative (or quasi-penal) nature of the fine, excluding a private law agreement 
between companies. According to this reasoning, firstly, competition law makes an 
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16  Joined Cases C-402/07 Sturgeon and Others and Böck v Air France [2009] ECR I-10923. 
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effort to protect competition, and, secondly, it individually punishes guilty companies 
which formed part the undertaking liable for the infringement. As a consequence, the 
budgetary considerations related to the recovery of the fine are only secondary. 
The second judge, instead, favours a reasoning based on the function of the specific 
legal rule providing for joint and several liability, focusing on the fact that the recovered 
fines become part of the public resources. His approach can be understood as an effort 
to stop the application of the rules of competition law at the undertaking’s level, without 
reaching to the individual companies that it comprises. It is a priori motivated by purely 
legal elements, since, in competition law, legislative texts are concerned with 
undertakings rather than companies. Thus, the second judge could be seen as 
interpreting and applying the notion of undertaking, as provided for by the law, in a 
very strict and faithful manner. 
However, that approach is not without its problems. We should keep in mind that the 
notion of undertaking was created as a description of an economic reality, rather than a 
precisely defined legal category, and this inherent issue has not been resolved, despite it 
being used ever more frequently, to the point of creating a certain fashion. As a 
consequence, the legislative text comes at odds with formal legal reasoning, since it 
imposes a responsibility for illegal conduct on an entity which is not precisely defined and 
which is devoid of legal personality according to the case-law. How can an entity be made 
responsible when in law it has no capacity in this respect? Unfortunately, the problem 
cannot be resolved pragmatically, since an undertaking consisting of a group of companies 
lacks not only legal personality, but also any specific bodies, property, stability or will. 
Thus, while an undertaking has certain economic functions, it is missing both a traditional 
legal personality recognised by law and the qualities which could provide it with some 
level of autonomy and, therefore, personality on the factual level. The only entity with a 
legal personality, property, and ability to pay fines is the company.  
This case illustrates a whole scale of issues related to the role of legal and extra-legal 
elements in the creation and interpretation of law. In the first place, the creation of the 
notion of undertaking reflected an extra-legal, policy-driven motivation, with the 
legislator wishing to regulate a situation not covered by traditional legal constructs. 
Once the legislator reflected his policy in specific rules, the judge must then conciliate 
them with existing legal mechanisms, which poses challenges with respect to their 
interpretation following the formal principles of logic and their function. This 
underscores the usefulness and necessity of the parallel development of both legal and 
economic notions: while rules able to replace or complement a legal text may evolve in 
practice, judicial decisions need to be precise, profound and consistent in order to cause 
as few problems as possible in everyday life.  
Similar examples abound in other domains. In the fundamentally different matter of 
restrictive measures adopted under the common foreign and security policy, asset 
freezes are often applied to entities without legal personality, while, as mentioned 
above, the political aspect, typically aiming at exercising pressure on a foreign 
government, prevails over the legal aspect. The courts systematically declare entities 
devoid of legal personality admissible to contest the relevant decisions on the basis of 
the right to effective judicial protection, remarking, quite logically, that, if the entity 
was considered to be sufficiently autonomous for it to be subject to the restrictive 
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measures, it must be accepted, on grounds of consistency and justice, that the same 
conclusion must be reached as to its ability to contest them. 
 
Is there any common lesson that the above cases can teach us? 
In each example, the judge had to choose one of the several aspects of a case, which 
comprised not only specific rules and law principles, but also general objectives pursued by 
the legislation, specific circumstances of every case, his personal preferences etc. The judge 
had, in every case, a legitimate reason for his choice, which can nevertheless be contested on 
other grounds. In this sense, a legal text is indeed, as mentioned by Hart, an “open texture”, 
because every general term is open in its concretisation.
17
 At the same time, whenever the 
judge takes one of the many possible aspects of interpretation as the basis of his decision, his 
specific concretisation tends to be “cast in stone”, especially where it is confirmed by further 
case-law; this is without prejudice of the fact that it is sometimes difficult to maintain a 
consistent case-law, a foreseeable legal interpretation, or even the legal text in effect.  
Another point that has to be kept in mind is that the true motivation underlying the 
decision will not be always discovered. The outside analysis is based only on the text of the 
judgement, which ultimately constitutes only a part of the story. Specifically, in some 
instances, it cannot be excluded that the final outcome is, to a certain limit, influenced by 
random factors and, therefore, haphazard in part. Still, this randomness does not affect the 
authority of the resulting decision as part of the law effectively governing the society. 
As a final remark regarding the judiciary, it should be noted that questions of 
legitimacy and of opportunism bear particular weight in the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. This is not simply because it is an international jurisdiction, but because 
it is one of the European institutions whose cases it decides. As a consequence, the Court 
of Justice may appear as both the judge and a party to the case, which means that the 
public must be particularly convinced of its impartiality and objectivity if it is to resist the 
tendency to euroscepticism. 
 
2. 3. Attorneys 
 
An attorney can be partial and must be so. It is his job. Of course, his partiality should 
remain within the framework of legality. Often, this depends on his morality and honesty. 
His interpretation of law should be based on case-law and academic works, not only because 
it adds weight to his reasoning, but also because it contributes to the legality of his pleadings. 
Nevertheless, if there is no pre-existing case-law and no jurisprudence, an attorney’s 
interpretation can play an important role. As a consequence, if the attorney’s interpretation is 
excessively partial and is not identified as such, it can distort the comprehension of a legal 
rule by the judge, who may be lead to believe that the interpretation in question is made in 
good faith. This issue is compounded by the fact that attorneys often contribute to academia, 
the partiality of their position becoming even more important and influent. At other times, an 
attorney’s interpretation could misrepresent and distort the correct meaning of the rule, 
thereby manipulating its understanding by the general public. Also, attorneys can and very 
often do influence legislation by way of lobbyism. 
                                                 
17  ATRIA, FERNANDO: On Law and Legal Reasoning, Hart, 2001, pp. 89–91. 
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The attorney’s approach is often superficial, since he has many clients and works 
under tight time constraints. The attorney seeks mainly his goal and is less interested in 
the correct comprehension of law. Obviously, the result of the analysis of a legal 
problem is dependent on a detailed examination all of its relevant aspects, and the 
greater the number of cases handled by the attorney, the lesser the achievable level of 
detail. On the other hand, an attorney seeking a viable solution for his client can identify 
the appropriate logic allowing the understanding of a legal rule. Therefore, an attorney 
can be a part of a self-regulating law system, provided that the results of his analysis are 
subsequently verified by a properly working judicial checking system. Unfortunately, 
another corrective element of the attorney’s work is very often absent: that of the client 
who would seek compensation for his attorney’s malpractice. In the majority of cases, 
the client is, in fact, not able to discover that the attorney has committed an error.  
 
2. 4. Academia 
 
In theory, scholarship is impartial, independent and seeks the truth. From this point of view, 
the academia may be viewed as a real guarantee of the discovery of every error in the 
creation, comprehension or application of law and of every mistake or partial interpretation 
arising in practice. In reality, unfortunately, the frequent professional conjunction of 
attorneys, judges and academics leads to an incomplete or partial analysis. On the other 
hand, where an academic works exclusively in the theoretical field, a high level of 
abstraction is required in order to deeply understand the practical functioning of a legal rule. 
A large and growing amount of information gives rise to the superficiality of analysis. 
Commentaries of case-law are more descriptive than critical and analytical, and the 
academics tend to examine a relatively narrow scope of questions, leaving many important 
ones aside. In this respect, the motivations behind the selection itself of a given question as a 
theoretical topic could make the subject of a separate – and difficult – analysis. Therefore, 





The law, its creation and functioning form a very complicated system. Within this 
mechanism, many elements of very different nature interact. On the one side, there are 
sociological, psychological and political influences; on the other side, elements of legal 
interpretation, including, beyond the rules themselves, the comprehension of context, the 
aspects of formal logic, the object of rules, legal principles etc. Furthermore, we have to 
add technical elements, such as the precise level of knowledge of facts and law texts 
resulting from the cognitive activity of the person interpreting the rule. While, in some 
instances, legal interpretation or creation based on extra-legal elements and motivated by a 
legitimate goal of reducing logical or textual contradictions can be accepted, the same 
does not hold true for efforts contrary to this goal, motivated by opportunism and pursuing 
an illegitimate, purely personal or group objective. While the boundary is clear in theory, 
the social reality is different. Sometimes, the real goal is easy to discover or to guess but 
difficult or impossible to prove, so that it has no bearing on the final outcome. In this 
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manner, defective rules are introduced in law and the whole legal system is deformed as a 
consequence. Due to the hierarchy of the rules that form the system, a final judgment or an 
adopted bill of law become part of law and are respected as such, including the defective 
rules they eventually contain. This phenomenon is constantly exacerbated by the growing 
complexity of legal regulation and the volume of case-law. Against this backdrop, how 
can one explain that the law as a whole still has the capacity to act, to an extent, as a 
guarantee of justice in an open society? 
Some authors have tried to answer this question by applying the notion of autopoiesis, 
i.e. the ability of a system to reproduce and maintain itself, to law.
18
 In simpler terms, in 
their view, the system of law as whole has an enormous capacity for absorption and 
correction of unfair decisions or wrong rules.   
In the current world, we are overwhelmed by information. Paradoxically, this 
overabundance limits the effectiveness of communication within the system and, thereby, 
the functioning of autopoiesis. Indeed, the latter supposes that every solution to every 
legal problem be examined by all components of the legal system, i.e. by the judiciary, the 
legal practice, the academia and the legislation. 
Yet, despite so many individual failures, wrong judgments, bad laws, incorrect 
academic analysis, we observe that, globally, the legal order still works. We find failures 
at every level of the mechanism of law. Besides all that has been mentioned above, there 
are poor lawyers inside every jurisdiction and bar association, as well as many bad law 
teachers and weak law students. It may be feared that these failures will collectively 
threaten the functioning of the whole legal system, and thereby the legal certainty and 
justice. The idea of autopoiesis can explain how the social regulation system that is law 
works in general, and how it is able to absorb many errors, or, alternatively to correct 
them. At the same time, if the sum of errors or their extent exceed a certain limit, the 
system will fail. In all probability, the situation is not critical under normal conditions and 
the functioning of the system is merely slower or less perfect. Nevertheless, it is important 
to consider the relationship between these weaknesses and their repercussions on the 
functioning of the whole system and its constituent parts. 
Thus, for example, were the Court of Justice of the European Union to render a 
logically unsound judgment, its verdict would affect many other legal notions and national 
law systems, normally prompting the need to repair the initial problem. Nevertheless, 
frequently, a problem in legislation or case-law is unaddressed and the application of law 
continues, despite some contradiction and inconsistency. For example, the confusion in 
European Union law between the notions of “company” and “undertaking” is common 
and has not been rectified in the course of interpretation. This shows that the legal system 
has an enormous capacity for auto-correction. More important than the individual errors is 
the state of society in general, its “immunity system”. Nevertheless, partial failures may 
still threaten the democratic system as a whole, leaving, at times, the impression that we 
are not far from the critical limit.  
                                                 
18  See Teubner, Gunther, “Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg” in Law & Society 
Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1984), pp. 291-301; Teubner, Gunther, Autopoietic Law - A New Approach to Law 
and Society, Walter de Gruyter, 1988; Michailakis, Dimitris, “Law as an Autopoietic System” in Acta 
Sociologica, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1995), pp. 323–337. 
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If I look for a practical conclusion deriving from my observations above, I am afraid 
that the reply is quite banal: we simply need to strengthen every part of the autopoietic 
legal system. The effort must start in the universities, but not only there. To control the 
problem of the intrusion of opportunism in law, we need lawyers – judges, legislators 
and so on – with high moral integrity. I have the impression that this is the main issue. 
Structured curricula vitae do not contain evidence of morality and honesty and nobody 
looks at the moral profile of a trainee judge or a candidate for Parliament. While this 
profile is no doubt known to the environment of the person concerned, it rarely plays a 
role in the appointment or election process. In this respect, we tend to be very passive, 
which is perhaps the root cause of many of the problems described above.  
Another related aspect lies in the fact that, in our stable modern society, there are very 
few critical moments which could shed light on the deepest traits of human character. 
Indeed, situations such as wars, occupations, or resistance against injustice are completely 
absent from the experience of our younger generations.  
It is also necessary to admit that law failures do not arise only from lack of honesty, 
but also from lack of knowledge and understanding. This issue points, once again, to the 
complexity of modern law and to the efficiency of the educational system in general. 
To conclude, I believe that the improvement of the functioning of the legal system as a 
whole is highly dependent on the level of education and professional knowledge, as well as 






LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL ELEMENTS OF MOTIVATION IN 
LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAW 




The article describes the different legal and, in particular, extra-legal elements which 
underlie the creation and interpretation of legal rules, as well as the interaction of these 
elements and the tensions and conflicts which arise between them. Specific attention is 
paid to the role of political considerations and opportunistic personal or group interests, in 
the context of the legislative procedure, the case-law of the courts, the pleadings of 
attorneys and the academia. The ability of the legal system to absorb and correct defective 
rules resulting from undue influence of extra-legal elements during the creation and 
interpretation of law is assessed from the perspective of autopoiesis. In conclusion, the 
fundamental importance of the competence and integrity of the individuals participating in 
the functioning of the legal system is stressed. 
 
